to cease or not to cease the lease by Marques, Tiago Vieira Pedro
1 
 
A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a 
Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and 
Economics 
 
 
 
Case Study 
Maritim, 2018: To cease or not to cease the lease 
 
 
 
 
Tiago Vieira Pedro Marques 
30103 
 
 
 
A Project carried out on the Master in Finance Program, under the supervision of: 
Francisco Queiró 
 
 
 
 
04/01/2019 
 
 
2 
 
Maritim, 2018: To cease or not to cease the lease 
 
Wednesday, February 14, 2018. The frozen roads surrounding his office in Bad Salzuflen, 
Germany, were the last concern of the Gerd Prochaska. The CEO of Maritimv  had an important 
decision to make on Hotel Düsseldorf, one of its most important and profitable hotels. The hotel 
group has an acquisition right on the property that expires in late 2019 and Mr. Prochaska knew 
that one false step could not only put his position at stake, but also severely damage the 
performance of the group and the reputation that it gained over the last six decades. Maritim 
currently pays a rent of €10m per year for the hotel in Düsseldorf and the request from the group 
was for Deutsche Bank to structure an acquisition financing of the Düsseldorf hotel that, taking 
into account all costs, is cheaper than the sum of the current interest expenses and the €10m of 
rent paid every year.  
Marriott, Intercontinental, Hilton and other high-end global hotel chains operate most of their 
hotels with “asset-light” operating models (Exhibit 1). In 2016, Maritim Hotelgesellschaft mbH 
(Maritim), a private hotel chain, operated 45 hotels worldwide, considerably less than its global 
public counterparts. Nevertheless, it has an impressive €121m of PP&E sitting in its balance 
sheet and relies on high capex levels to operate those hotels. In 2001, the group embarked on 
the acquisitions trail in its bid to continue its growth strategy outside Germany. The then 
spokesman for Maritim, Christian G. Windfuhr, said that the goal was to acquire good quality 
hotels in famous holiday destinations. The fact that the group was entering unchartered territory 
and that it had high growth plans, meant that the chain faced a very high cost of capital to 
compensate for the operational risk.  
The pipeline was now different. The acquisitions were to take place in Germany where the 
group was already the operator. Maritim considered exercising the acquisition rights it had for 
several hotels where the group was a tenant. Mr. Prochaska was, however, particularly 
concerned with the one that could have the biggest impact in the group: the right to acquire the 
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hotel in Düsseldorf for €150m. Back in February 2018, Mr. Prochaska requested Deutsche Bank 
(DB) to structure an acquisition financing of the hotel. For him, the financing conditions of 
such operation could make or break the decision of adopting an operating model based on 
property ownership versus an “asset-light” one.  
 
About the group 
The Maritim group is family-owned. Dr. Monika Gomolla, one of the owners, serves as 
Chairman of Supervisory Board at Maritim Hotelgesellschaft mbH and as an Executive Director 
of HMS International Hotel GmbH. The company attributes its early success to the fact that it 
has been present at prime locations in the Federal Republic of Germany since the opening of 
the first hotel in the late 60’s and to the fact that it offers extensive congress and event capacities. 
The group has a sound name in the industry and has been known for many years as one of the 
best German hotel chains. The comprehensive hotel portfolio includes hotels located in city 
centres, airport hotels, sport-focused hotels and resorts. The market segments of "business 
travelers" and "meetings and congresses", which are of prime importance for Maritim, 
accounted for 62.9% of the turnover and 55.8% of the occupied rooms.  
Besides the brand licencing and the sourcing of hotel management agreements, Prochaska’s 
strategy of expanding the portfolio of Maritim operated hotels is also based on the acquisition 
of existing hotels and on the construction of new ones. Some of the acquired or built properties 
are sold to infrastructure investors and then leased back. Others are sold and managed thereafter 
with an Hotel Management Agreement (HMA). In 2017, Maritim Hotelgesellschaft mbH 
operated 45 hotels with a total capacity of 14,844 rooms in the financial year of 2016. Out of 
the 45 hotels, 7 were run as through HMAs, 8 through franchise agreements, 15 as leased 
properties and another 15 as owned properties (Exhibit 2). Of the 22 hotels that Maritim 
operates as tenant or manager, 3 are owned by companies in which Maritim has a significant 
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stake. In 2016, a total of €15m was invested in the acquisition, maintenance and improvements 
of properties managed under Maritim’s brand (Exhibit 3).  
Hotel chains worldwide face pressure from shareholders to turn their business into an asset-
light one and substitute hotel ownership for leases1 , HMAs and franchising models. The 
question that the management of the hotel chain often comes up with is not whether a model is 
better than another but whether a given model for a given hotel makes sense. The operating 
company (Opco) Maritim Hotelgesellschaft mbH currently pays €28m in a Triple Net2 20-year 
agreement to the 15 property companies (Propcos), the entities that own the hotels. In addition 
to the €28m in annual lease payments, the opco also pays €1-2m per year in maintenance costs. 
 
Recent developments 
The onboarding of this German hotel group to Deutsche Bank (DB) started in April 2016, when 
DB was asked to provide financing for the purchase of an hotel in Magdeburg, in the south of 
Germany. The purchase price for the hotel that had negative EBITDA was €56m. Ultimately, 
Mr. Prochaska and his team decided against buying the hotel and instead acquired a 14% stake 
in the holding company of the property, which was later increased to 21%. In 2018, Deutsche 
Bank was asked to provide financing for the purchase of the hotel in Köln. The purchase price 
for this hotel was €180m, 14x rent.  
Now, with one of the most important acquisitions rights expiring relatively soon, Prochaska 
wanted to be sure that the €150m acquisition right for the hotel in Düsseldorf was worth 
exercising. The group had other cards on the table such as the option to extend the current 
                                                          
1 Under the German GAAP, a rental expense under an operating lease is currently recognised as a P&L item on a straight-line 
basis over the lease term and the contracted leasing as an off-balance sheet item. However, from January 2019 onwards, 
companies covered by the IFRS 16 are required to record operational leases as a liability and the “right to use” the asset as a 
depreciable asset, even if the company does not own the asset. Nevertheless, according to a study made by HVS, a variable 
lease payment contract or a one-year leasing with extension clauses avoids that the lease is reported as a liability, which might 
allow this operating model to survive in the European Union.x 
2 Leasing contract that stipulates that the tenant shall bear the costs related to the leased asset, in addition to the rental fee. 
 
5 
 
leasing agreement and the possibility to negotiate an HMA or find a third-party operator (TPO) 
and, at the same time, negotiate a franchising agreement with the owner. Mr. Prochaska had the 
objective of knowing whether it was possible to structure an acquisition financing that made 
owning an hotel the best choice when compared to other existing operating models. After all, 
by owning the property, the hotel group instead of paying annual leases, can partially or wholly 
finance a hotel with debt, with a financing structure that increases the free cash flow of the 
group by having a new annual debt service lower than the sum of the lease payments and the 
current debt service3 (Exhibit 4).  
In the financial year of 2017, the 33 Maritim hotels located in Germany were able to increase 
their operating profit by 5.8%, the average room rate from €131.60 to €139.20, the average 
occupancy rate from 63.5% to 65.3% and the turnover from €375m to €385m (Exhibit 5). The 
total turnover of all hotels managed under the brand name Maritim also improved to €472m4 
when compared to the previous year. A positive development is particularly evident in the 
"Turkish Riviera" / Belek region. In the Egyptian destinations on the other hand, no increased 
booking volume is noticeable. In Egypt and Turkey, Maritim is either a franchisor or operates 
the hotels through management contracts since the hotel chain considers that the real estate 
sector is too volatile in the region. The Maritim hotels in Mallorca, Tenerife and Mauritius 
achieved a particularly good result in 2017. 
The average room rate at Maritim has improved by €2.48 compared to the previous year and 
stands at €98.35. Room occupancy in 2016 increased by 4.76% and the RevPAR5 increased by 
7.47%. Before that, in 2016, the hotel chain had a comprehensive renovation across the hotel 
portfolio. Examples include the general refurbishment of Maritim Hotel Stuttgart completed in 
August 2016 and the renovation of the hotel in Ulm in April 2016 costing €8.3m and €7.4m, 
                                                          
3 Includes the repayment of principal. 
4 This turnover figure is consolidated under HMS hotel management services international and includes revenues from non-
German hotels. 
5 RevPAR or revenue per available room, is a performance metric in the hotel industry that is calculated by dividing a hotel's 
total guestroom revenue by the room count and the number of days in the period being measured. 
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respectively. As of February 2016, the Hotel in Königswinter underwent a complete renovation 
that was completed by May 2017. All these remodeling and renovation works were carried out 
while the business was running. 
 
The hospitality industry 
One of the factors that affects the choice of the hotel operating model is the forecasted demand 
growth of the sector. If a very cyclical demand is anticipated, franchise and management 
agreement will be preferred over leases and property ownership-based models. Following the 
financial crisis, enormous growth of investment projects has taken place in the German hotel 
industry. Better conditions in the financial markets, a recovery in hotel performance and the 
VAT reduction for hotel accommodation in the beginning of 2010 released a previously 
unknown investment power in the German hotel industry, which manifested itself in 2016 with 
a new peak.  In 2016, 5,665 investment projects were recorded in Germany.  According to the 
IHA hotelmarkt 2017 report i, the average German hotel industry's RevPAR in 2016 was €66 
in 2016, slightly above the European average of €65. According to the latest Meeting and Event 
Barometer 2015/20166, Germany continues to rank at the top as the conference destination with 
more popularity among the surveyed organizers worldwide.   
Despite this, Mr. prochaska was worried about a new type of competition and he had reasons 
for that. Airbnb, a leading online platform for hospitality services, started a partnership with a 
real estate developer to launch its own branded-apartments whereby the real estate developer, 
who owns the property, will rent out the apartments to private tenantsii. Unlike hotel operators, 
Airbnb will not manage the operations in the property nor is charging the real estate operator 
(Newgard) for the use of its brand.  According to Financial Timesiii, the online platform is 
expected to take 3% of the nightly room rates, the exact same commission it currently charges 
                                                          
6 The Meeting & Event Barometer is a study that examines the event and conference market in Germany on an annual basis. 
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hosts through its platform. The real estate developer will take 25% of the same room rate, with 
the rest going to the tenants who are in charge of subletting the apartments. The platform seems 
to be quite optimistic in being successful with such strategy, given that they want to take home-
sharing to everywhere in the US. If the expansion strategy is indeed successful, it should be a 
matter of time until they start selecting attractive neighborhoods in Europe. Despite 
overcapacities and the resulting cutthroat competition, the willingness to invest in hotel projects 
in Germany remains high. In its industry report 2017, the International Hotel Association points 
out that the focus of the planned investments in new hotel projects in 2016, as in previous years, 
was in the 3- and 4-star segment. In total, 85,115 new hotel rooms in Germany are planned 
within the next three years, of which a total of 38,092 rooms are in the 4-star category. In the 
3-star segment, 22,997 new rooms are currently being planned. This additional occupancy 
potential of 61,089 rooms will further intensify competition in the 3- and 4-star segment.  
 
Financial position and financing proposal 
Even though the group had high PP&E in its balance sheet, the group was not over levered. On 
the contrary, the opco Maritim hotelgesellschaft mbH had €38m (Exhibit 6) of debt in 2017. 
With cash standing at €40m and an EBITDA of €43m, the firm was levered at Net 
Debt/EBITDA ratio close to 0x. Even with this almost non-existent leverage, the group was 
still paying an average interest rate of 5.0%. In 2017, this resulted in interest expenses of €1.2m. 
The rent of the 15 internally leased hotels is currently transferred to the international holding 
company in order to support the debt service of the holding. This junior debt, usually referred 
to as holdco debt, is a mezzanine piece. This is a subordinated debt element structurally 
subordinated to the debt sitting at the opco and propco levels (at the operating entity and 
property levels, respectively) and has a risk premium7 of 620bps. The indebtedness of the HMS 
                                                          
7 Difference between the junior interest rate and senior interest rate. 
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holding was €320m in 2017. With a cash amount of €48m and an EBITDA of €75m, the holdco 
had a net leverage of 3.6x.  
The tenor of the current financing package for the 15 propcos of the group varies between the 
respective loans, but in the year of 2018 €28m of debt was outstanding, resulting in a net debt 
ratio of –0.6x based on 2016’s EBITDA. In case the acquisition is the chosen route, Maritim 
clearly has the capacity to leverage at the propco level.  
The group does not have cross default8 nor cross acceleration9 covenants in its current financing 
structure. Therefore, the consequences of a contract breach10 would have little impact on other 
affiliates, apart from the potentially damaged brand and from the impossibility to operate the 
hotel where the breach happened. To finance the purchase of the hotel in Düsseldorf, Deutsche 
Bank estimated a financing volume of up to €180m, of which €150m (15x rent) correspond to 
the purchase price and €30m to 20% of the purchase price for fees and other costs. This amount 
does not include the replacement of the existing financing on the hotels in own possession of 
around €28m. Mr. Prochaska was, thus, seeking a financing amount of €208m from DB. With 
a pro-forma EBIDAR of €48m, this financing would result in a gross adjusted ratio of 4.3x11. 
A traditional standalone financing would not work since the acquisition price is higher than the 
current market value of the property. 
This estimated financing volume is divided into a senior and a subordinated tranche. The senior 
tranche bears an interest rate of around 3% and the structurally subordinated tranche bears 
interest rate of around 9%. The exact amount of savings that result from the refinancing and 
top-up financing depends on the acquisition price. Nonetheless, the increase in interest expenses 
is not proportional to the increase in the financing amount given that, in this case, the weighted 
                                                          
8 Cross default covenant is a non-financial covenant that triggers the default of all of the group if any of the controlled 
subsidiaries defaults. 
9 Cross acceleration covenant is a non-financial covenant that allows a lender to require the group to repay all of the lender’s 
outstanding debt. It differs from the cross-default covenant since the group does not enter into technical default. 
10 Such as the inability to pay leases to the hotels where the group is the lessee. 
11 (Bank debt + Factoring + Operational Leases + Provisions) / EBITDAR 
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average interest rate is not the same for all financing amounts. For a given collateral value, the 
maximum amount of senior debt is a fixed percentage of the collateral. Therefore, the bigger 
the financing above this maximum value, the bigger the junior tranche and, thus, the 
increasingly lower the savings.  
To fulfil Prochaska’s request in the best possible way, Deutsche Bank proposed a structure in 
which the owned hotels and the hotel in Düsseldorf are combined in a ring-fenced12 propco 
structure to serve as collateral. This ring-fenced structure would allow the financing of the 
acquisition as well as the refinancing of the existing financing of the hotels in own possession 
with annual interest payments of approximately €9m. To get a mortgage lending value of the 
real estate, a rent multiple of 10x13 was estimated14. In this case, the average rent of the leased 
properties as a percentage of EBITDAR is 83.3%, which yields a collateral value of €258.3m15, 
given the €19m 2016 EBITDA of the owned properties and the €10m of annual leasing 
payments of the Hotel in Düsseldorf. With 60% being the maximum senior LTMLV16, if 60% 
of the collateral value is higher than the total financing, this deal could be financed entirely with 
senior debt. Therefore, the bigger the rent multiple and the estimated total rent, the bigger could 
be the savings.  
All collateral would be valid at the level of the Opco as well as at the level of the Propco. This 
meant that all the hotels required priority and subordinate land register entries. For the above 
considered €208m of financing, the senior tranche (60% of the collateral) is €155m and the 
subordinated tranche €53m. With a cash balance of €40m and an EBITDAR of €31m, this 
resulted in a net leverage of 5.4x and in a weighted average interest rate of 4.5%. Individual 
                                                          
12 Ring-fencing here is defined as a requirement from the lender to limit the transfer of cash and other assets within a certain 
perimeter of a group of companies. In this case, the transfer of assets is limited between the collateralized hotels and the other 
hotels and/or entities of the group. 
13 The adopted multiple was based on internal information from previous transactions in the sector in the DACH region. 
14 Since the collateralized hotels are owned by the group, a “fictitious” rent value has to be estimated. In real estate valuation, 
rent is an industry standard base multiple for hotel valuation purposes. Given that hotel lessors require a certain yield for a 
given location risk (cyclicality, environmental, etc.), rent is usually a feasible indicator of profitability. 
15 Collateral = rent multiple * (Düsseldorf annual lease + estimated rent of remaining hotels) . 
16 Loan to Mortgage Lending Value. 
10 
 
assets could be sold if the LTMLV after the transaction was not above a threshold of 80%. If 
this were the case, part of the sale proceeds would have to be used for debt repayment, so that 
the LTMLV could be below this threshold. Moreover, a majority stake sale of the group would 
not necessarily lead to a repatriation or refinancing of the loan. This gave Prochaska some room 
for maneuver and the CEO just wanted to make sure that at the opco level, the remaining 
EBITDA from franchised and managed properties could be used to raise additional capital 
without being subject to this LTMLV threshold.  
The shares of Maritim’s opcos and propcos would be pledged17. This covenant, very used in 
the UK as a lender protection, cannot, however, be “used” to its full potential under German 
law18, given that Deutsche Bank can only sell the pledge shares once the company is under 
administration in court. The bank would, therefore, be exposed to volatility in the share price 
until the process is settled. Other financial covenants would include Debt Service Coverage 
Ratio, Debt/Market Value, Debt/Lending Value and Net Debt/EBITDA. A cash sweep 
covenant19 would be used as a metric for a potential additional repayment. Mr. Prochaska was 
now in position to evaluate the pros and cons of the acquisition. 
 
Time to make a choice on Düsseldorf 
The clock was ticking for the hotel group. Mr. Prochaska needed to know whether the 
acquisition was the best strategy to adopt in order to operate the hotel. At first sight, given the 
considerably lower needed capex, an asset-light model seems to be more attractive from a 
relative return perspective when compared to an asset-heavy one. However, a number of asset-
light companies from several industries are opting for a “not so light” model. UBER, for 
                                                          
17 Share pledge can be understood as a non-financial covenant that, depending on what is contractually agreed, allows the 
lender to sell a certain number of shares - usually just enough to cover the outstanding principal. 
18 According to Mayer Brown, a global law firm, under German law, the lender must apply for foreclosure measures at the 
relevant court. A forced sale can only be achieved by way of auction upon enforcement of the land charge. Enforcement of 
land charges will be carried out by the lender in accordance with the German foreclosure law (Zwangsversteigerungsgesetz, 
ZVG) by way of a forced auction (compulsory sale) of the property (Zwangsversteigerung). 
19 Cash sweep is the mandatory use of a certain amount free cash flow to repay part of the outstanding debt. 
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instance, is now buying 24,000 XC90s Volvo cars to implement the autonomous driving 
technology that it has been developing to compete with WAYMO20  and Tesla iv. Amazon 
acquired Whole Foods in 2017, increasing considerably the PP&E in its balance sheet. Farfetch, 
one of the leading premium fashion e-commerce companies is looking to open its first branded 
physical stores with the project “store of the future”. Flixbus, a leading low-cost inter-city bus 
service used to rent all of its buses until recently when they started to buy the vehicles to include 
in the fleet.  In the hospitality sector, it is not clear whether the advantages of not owning any 
properties overcome the generally lower profit upside potential.  
Moreover, with DB’s proposed financing, Maritim would save about €2.5m annually over the 
term of the loan of 7 to 8 years. If one-time costs and prepayment penalties are added to the 
new financing expenses, the total cash-flow savings would be approximately €15m over 8 years. 
If after these 8 years the group manages to be refinanced, a similar amount of annual savings 
should be expected.  
For the owned hotels, a market and mortgage lending valuation would have to be prepared in 
order to finalize the financing structure. Other advantages of the refinancing included having a 
lender that could proactively follow the business model and that is aware of future projects, 
thereby avoiding conflicts among different creditors and Maritim. One alternative to owning 
the hotel would be extending the leasing contract and continue operating it under a leasing 
agreement. The tenant, Maritim, could then choose to either operate directly the hotel or 
subcontract operations through a third-party operator.  Infrastructure investors and private 
investors usually do not have the expertise to operate a hotel, and thus, they decide to hand over 
the operations and receive instead a more stable cash flow: the rent. This cash flow is, however, 
less stable than what one may think since hotel operators can always try to negotiate the 
conditions of the lease. 
                                                          
20 Waymo was formerly known as Google self-driving car project. 
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“Personally with leases I have bad experiences. When it’s very good, it’s very good, but when 
it’s bad the operator tends to come to you to renegotiate the lease.” v 
Edward Wojakovski - CEO of Tonstate Group Ltd 
 
HMA and franchising agreement as alternatives for Düsseldorf 
“Although asset-heavy business models, such as owner-operated hotels, allow tighter control over 
hotel operations, the managed and franchised models offer quicker growth due to lower capital 
investments. However, they require strong relationships with third-party hotel owners.”  
– IHA Annual report 2017i 
 
An HMA was seen as an alternative by Mr. Prochaska for the current lease of Düsseldorf. On 
the one hand, Maritim would keep the exact same operations and stop paying the rent. On the 
other hand, Maritim would stop receiving the full revenue of the hotel and would start receiving 
a fee that is a small percentage of those same revenues. This fee is composed of a management 
fee that, in most of the cases, is around 2% of the revenue and an incentive fee equal to a 
percentage of any increase in revenue over the previous year (Exhibit 7). Nevertheless, some 
operators try to win management contracts by having fees substantially below the industry 
average.  
The fact that the hotel manager is in charge of the operations does not preclude the owner from 
bearing the operational risk. In fact, in an HMA, it is usually the owner that bears such risk 
(including staffing/human resources). For an HMA to be as symbiotic as possible, it is important 
to have an alignment of interests, which in reality does not always exist. The misalignment can 
exist at two levels: economic value added and profit margin. If the managing entity is 
compensated with a fee entirely based on revenues, there is a risk that the marginal ROIC is 
13 
 
inferior to the cost of capital of the owner and that unnecessary operational expenses incurred 
to have small increases in the top line plunge the profit margin. 
Another alternative for Mr. Prochaska is finding a third-party operator (“TPO”) for the hotel 
and at the same time trying to negotiate a franchise agreement with the current owner of hotel 
in Düsseldorf. With regards to the franchise model, the owner of the property, who is also the 
franchisee, would have the right to use Maritim’s brand, the distribution network and other 
intellectual property of Maritim. In contrast with the HMA, in the franchising agreement the 
owner retains control21 of the property. Nevertheless, the owner could always choose to have a 
third party who is usually owner-facing (i.e. profit maximizer) to operate the hotel. This third-
party operator (TPO) can be essential if the owner has limited experience, given that the TPO 
can bring a rigid budgeting strategy and be more efficient. As with the HMA, the franchising 
agreement requires careful consideration when negotiating the fee structure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21 Control in this context means being responsible for the hotel operations. 
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Exhibits 
Exhibit 1 – Hotel portfolio of global chains discriminated by operating model 
 
 
 
Exhibit 2 – Financing scope of the acquisition of the hotel in Düsseldorf 
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Exhibit 3 – Consolidated cash flow statement of Maritim Hotelgesellschaft mbH 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 4 – Opco debt repayment - Status quo vs DB Scenario 
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Exhibit 5 – Consolidated income statement of Maritim Hotelgesellschaft mbH 
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Exhibit 6 - Consolidated balance sheet of Maritim Hotelgesellschaft mbH 
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Exhibit 7 – Typical fee structure in HMAs and TPO agreements  
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Teaching note 
 
Critical issues 
This case study presents the real example of a private hotel chain facing a decision that can 
heavily impact its competitiveness. Maritim wants to avoid overpaying for the property in 
Düsseldorf, even though it is one of the most profitable ones. More importantly, this case gives 
students insights to discuss whether an “asset-heavy” model can be a better choice for private 
hotel chains like Maritim as opposed to an “asset-light” operating model that is based on Hotel 
Management Agreements and franchise fees. To achieve a conclusion on what decision is best 
for an operator like Maritim, a number of factors have to be weighted including the financing 
context, the geography, the competitive environment and the market.  
 
Use of the case 
This case and its questions are particularly relevant for students in the Master in Finance and in 
the Master in Management who are taking courses that cover financial strategy, operational 
strategy and M&A related topics such as “Corporate Finance”, “Applied Corporate Finance”, 
“Mergers, Acquisitions, Restructuring”, “Operations Strategy”, “Project Management”, “Brand 
Management”, “Strategy” and “Entrepreneurial Finance & Venture Capital”. Even though this 
case requires a limited quantitative analysis from students, it allows them to be immersed in a 
practical situation wherein a company is faced with a decision on what operational model to 
adapt. Students should also analyse the financial consequences of the decision, the impact on 
the group’s growth and the impact on its brand. 
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Discussion questions 
 
1. On what factors does the choice of an operating model depend on?  
Growth strategy 
Maritim has a strategy that relies on international expansion and a triple-digit annual growth 
goal in the number of rooms. Therefore, even though the revenue per operated room is generally 
lower for asset-light models, these are the best ones to adopt for a quicker expansion of the 
brand and increase the number of operated properties given the lower required investment. 
Profit per managed room 
In contrast with a franchisor, manager and to a lesser extent, with a lessee, a property owner 
bears all the upside of the operational profit for a given hotel. Many management agreements 
do not include the reimbursement of costs of operations, be them direct (such as food, electricity, 
water and gas) or indirect (expenses that do not vary with the level of production, such as 
insurance and financial obligations related to human resources). For a hotel chain that is not so 
much focused on growth but rather on the profitability of the current operations, an asset-heavy 
model based on hotel ownership is more adequate given the tighter control over maintenance 
costs and overall expenses. Moreover, the more collateral a hotel chain can present when 
requesting a financing, the lower the interest rates and the better the overall financing conditions.  
Ownership  
In the hospitality sector, listed companies’ shareholders require their firms to constantly 
improve the return on capital employed. This, along with share buy backs and predictable 
income from the franchise and management agreements, tends to increase the share price and 
attract new capital sources. Maritim, by being privately owned and by not having such 
requirements from the shareholders, relies a lot more on property ownership in comparison to 
its public counterparts. 
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Location 
Each location has different risks associated with it. Geopolitical, environmental, and economic 
risks are factors that influence the cyclicality of the real estate sector and the hospitality demand. 
For a given location, the more cyclical the real estate, the more difficult it is to estimate a yield 
on the property. Hotel operators usually only operate within a relatively small yield range, and 
thus, cannot afford to buy or even be a lessee on such locations. Hotel management agreements 
and franchising agreements are usually the preferred models for more cyclical and risky 
locations. 
 
2. What type of agency problems can arise in each model? 
The way contracts are structured and negotiated give rise to different agency problems. An 
owner has to negotiate a budget with the hotel operator on a yearly basis. The initial budget is 
usually linked to performance metrics such as the RevPAR and Gross Operating Profit. A 
conflict here is not uncommon since operators will want a higher budget in the cases where 
some or all the operating expenses are incurred by the owner. With regards to personnel, nor 
the owner nor the operator want to bear the responsibilities of employment. In Germany, the 
owner tends to be the legal employer, even though all the training and staff related matters are 
responsibility of the manager. In relation to capital expenditures, the owner is usually the 
responsible for the funding of maintenance capex.vi It would be straightforward to think that 
managers would incentivize owners to invest in capex as much as possible, given that managers 
do not take it out of their pockets. Sometimes, however, capex related projects have a high 
negative impact on revenue (e.g. having several rooms closed for extensive periods of time). 
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3.  Is there an operating model better than another for Maritim?  
Operating a hotel through leases is becoming less appealing and owning it seems to be a more 
attractive option given the current low market interest rates. Furthermore, being an owner 
allows the sale of the property later on if needed.  Nevertheless, the choice of the operating 
model of a hotel is not a binary decision. Hotel Management Agreements (HMAs) and 
franchises are becoming preferred options over leases and ownership-based models by global 
hotel chains. These models allow a faster brand dissemination and the chance to earn 
management and franchising fees with a relatively low investment. With regards to upside 
potential, in most of the cases, both HMA fees22 and franchise royalties are lower than the profit 
obtained when the hotel is either owned or leased, given that HMA and franchise fees are 
usually a percentage of sales23. 
On the other hand, for a hotel generating negative net income, the downside can be very 
different in each situation. For negative profit levels there are usually no franchising nor 
management fees24 but neither there is downside risk25. Lessees and owners, however, must 
still pay the leases and service the debt even if they have a negative EBITDAR and EBITDA, 
respectively. In this case, the lender will file the hotel for foreclosure, unless no other action is 
taken by the ownervii. The lessee, by not being able to pay the leases, will enter into a contractual 
default. This may or may not be renegotiated, but the lessee is in risk of losing the contract and, 
therefore, the operations of the hotel – and eventually other hotels also operated by the lessee 
that belong to the same owner.  
If well negotiated, the management contract, by charging the hotel owner 2 to 5% of the hotel 
revenues and up to 20% of the net income, seems quite appealing. Furthermore, in case of 
                                                          
22 Usually this figure is the same as revenues given that under an HMA, direct and indirect costs of operations are usually 
reimbursed by the property owner. 
23 Sometimes the fee structure also includes a small percentage of profits 
24 Usually only operating costs reimbursements. 
25 Downside risk is here defined as the loss of capital. 
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negative results, the hotel management entity does not necessarily cease to manage the hotel, 
unless there is such termination clause in the agreement. Both “asset-light” models generate 
higher levels of cash for a given investment, and thus, a higher return on capital employed. 
Even though there are some key differences between the HMA and the franchising model, the 
main one being the fact that the franchisor Maritim does not operate the hotel in stricto sensu 
but advises on management and operational policies, the fees from both franchising and HMAs 
seem quite attractiveviii.  
Furthermore, in the case of the HMA, there is also a degree of dependence on ownership for 
project development and capital injections, mainly for maintenance capex. When insufficient 
capital investment is received, the brand can be negatively impacted due to several reasons 
including lack of property maintenance. Nevertheless, in the current low interest rate 
environment, owning a hotel turns out to be, in the majority of the cases, several times more 
profitableix.   
With regards to hotels where Maritim is a franchisor, the group does not operate the property. 
Therefore, when the owner does not possess the necessary skills to do so, TPOs can prove to 
be an efficient solution given their niche expertise for a given location and segment. Contrary 
to the general belief that TPOs steal market share from franchisors, these two market players 
are very complementary given that very often a franchisee is not an industry expert and prefers 
to have a TPO with local market expertise. 
 
4. Is there such a thing as a perfect combination of operating models that maximizes 
profitability and minimizes operational and financial risk?  
These models are discussed in the optic of Maritim which is considered a branded operator. 
Ownership based models and leasing are generally more appropriate for use in developed 
markets, in places with a less cyclical real estate and with stable hospitality demand levels. 
24 
 
These two require higher investments, but they also allow higher profits compared to other 
models and avoid some of the agency problems discussed above. Franchises and HMAs are 
good bets in the case the operator is over levered, or in case it has a very reputable and known 
brand in place. Properties where the owner does not have the expertise to run a hotel might 
seem an opportunity to put in place an HMA. However, global brands such as Marriott tend to 
be contacted during the construction phase of the property to brand it, operate it or both. This 
means that most operator-free properties were not of interest to such brands as the offered terms 
were probably not appealing. For example, if an owner demands that the operator is in charge 
of capex investments as well as all direct and indirect costs, the risk-adjusted return decreases 
considerably.  
 
5. Should the current leasing agreement for the hotel Düsseldorf be substituted by an 
HMA or franchise agreement instead? 
Given that Maritim has successfully operated the hotel for several years, the market risk is 
considerably lower. If Maritim becomes a simple franchisor, the profit related to this property 
decreases substantially. The same happens to a lesser extent with an HMA, with the aggravating 
factor that as a manager, Maritim might still incur some hefty operating costs. Moreover, the 
fact that real estate has been historically stable for the past 6 decades and that the chain can 
always sell the property in the future, an ownership-based model for Düsseldorf seems to be 
the most reasonable choice.  
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Disclaimer 
This case study, which has been prepared by the author while working at the Credit Structuring 
Department of Deutsche Bank AG, has been produced exclusively for the benefit of the 
assessment of the work project. The recipient is not permitted to reproduce in whole or in part 
the information provided in this case study or to communicate the information to any third party 
without prior consent of the author. The statements, positioning, valuations and opinions 
present in this case are not, and should not be construed as an indication that Deutsche Bank 
provides favorable research coverage or publishes research containing any assessment of the 
financial, commercial or any other kind of performance of Maritim Hotelgesellschaft mbH 
(“Maritim”) and respective subsidiaries, affiliates or group-related companies. 
This presentation is i) for academic purposes only, and ii) speaks only as of the date it is given, 
reflecting prevailing market conditions and the views expressed are subject to change based 
upon a number of factors, including market conditions and the company’s business and 
prospects. Deutsche Bank did not independently verify the accuracy and completeness of all 
information which may have been provided directly or indirectly by the company. No 
representation or warranty is made as to the information’s accuracy or completeness and 
Deutsche Bank assumes no obligations to update the information. The analyses contained in 
the present document are not, and do not purport to be, appraisals of the assets, stock, or general 
business of Maritim. Nothing herein shall be taken as constituting the giving of investment 
advice and this case study is not intended to provide, and must not be taken as, the basis of any 
decision and should not be considered as any type of recommendation by Deutsche Bank. The 
recipients of this case study must make their own independent assessment and such 
investigations as it deems necessary. Nothing in this case study is intended to create or shall be 
construed as any kind of relationship between the recipients and Deutsche Bank. 
